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Political Participation Among Prisoners 
DONALD E. WHISTLER 
University of Central Arkansas 
Introduction 
Penal systems are among our most serious problem s.1 Recent riots and 
rhetoric have captured our attention, but have not incr ease d our knowledge of 
the political attitudes and activities of prisoners. 2 This research : (1) concep-
tualizes and measures political participation among men in prison ; (2) ob-
serves the association of selected sets of social, political , and penal variables 
with the inmates' political participation ; (3) compares the inmates ' political 
participation to that of the general public ; and , (4) compares minimum and 
maximum security samples . 
There are two independent samples of prisoners. One consists of 77 
volunteers from the 300-man "model" Illinois state minimum security institu -
tion at Vienna 3 , sampled in March 1972 with much cooperation from adminis-
trators and residents. The other contains 112 men from the 1100 who were in 
the Arkansas maximum security unit at Cummins. The questionnaire 4 was 
administered to them in April 1972. 5 The samples are not random of all 
American prisons, but do tap institutional characteristics commonly found and 
are of different security arrangements. 
Conceptualization of the Study : Dependent Variables 
Political participation among prisoners (dependent variable ) is concep-
tualized in two ways. First , activities concerned with formal elections held 
among prisoners to determine representatives in Inmate Councils are ob-
served. These are : interest expressed, voting, campaign activities, and run-
ning for or holding an inmate office. Questions 1-6 in Appendix I are mea-
sures. This is called formal inmate participation, and corresponds to conven-
tional ways that political participation has been conceptualized in research 
involving the general American population. 6 The second way concerns com-
1lt is difficult to report the magnitude of the rroblem because of unreported and/or 
inaccurately reported stati stics. However , on a "typical day federal pri sons contain some 20,000 
prisoners, state 200,000 and local about 160,000. 
2For a sampling see : New York Times Index, 1971, pp. 1385-89. 
:¥fhe Vienna Obseroer, October 8, 1971, p . 1. 
"The instrument was pretested at the Work Release Center in Carbondale, Illinois in wint er 
1971-72. The residents screened terms or phraseology , and for items that had a different meaning 
to prisoners or would not be answered honestly . 
5The Cummins unit was/is in the process of court-ordered reform (Holt v Sarver , 300 F. 
Supp . 825) following disclosure of brutality {see Thomas Murton and Joe Hyams , Accomplices to 
the Crime, (New York: Grove Press, 1969). The Cummins sample repres ents an effort by the new 
Department of Corrections and the Cummins Administration to demonstrate their commitment 
to an open and progressive institution . The Cummins men were selected by the Associate 
Superintendent of Treatment , Ronald Dobbs , using the criteria of literacy, respect among 
inmates, and inclusion of those recently elected ot the new Inmate Council. 
8See : Lester Milbrath, Political Participation , (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965), p . 
18; Donald Matthews and James Prothro , Negroes and the New Southern Politics, {New York: 
Harcourt , Brace, and World , Inc ., 1966), p. 53. 
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petiti on and/or cooperation for thin gs valued amon g prison ers . 7 Thi s is named 
inform al inm ate pruticip ation , and is operation alized by the extent to which an 
inm ate's advice or opinion s are sought after or listened to regardin g thing s of 
value to pri soners (see qu estion s 7-12 App endix I). 
Distributi on of Inmat e Political Activities 
The data rega rdin g form al (Table 1) and inform al (Tabl e 2) prison e r politi cs 
sugges ts that men in minimum (Vienn a) and maximum (Cummins ) security 
institution s engage in inm ate politi cs to about th e same extent ; differenc es 
occur in form al activiti es only with regard to inmat e votin g (significantly 
higher at ,;;; .05 in the minimum security group ), and informall y there is a 
slightl y higher, thou gh non -significant , rat e of particip ant s within th e 
maximum security group . Whil e th ere is littl e difference betwee n th e pri s-
oner sampl es, each inm ate group see ms to particip ate in its formal politi cs 
mor e than the American public does in its compar able politic s. 8 Thi s mee ts 
expectation s because the closed natur e of penal institution s causes most 
eve nt s out of the pri son routin e to rece ive widespr ead pri soner att ention . 9 
Finall y, Tabl es l and 2 demon strat e that there is enou gh varianc e in both 
typ es of inmat e politics to inquir e into their po ssible association s with selected 
variables in the remaind er of thi s paper. 
TABLE I 
DISTRIBUTION OF FORMAL• INMATE 




Leve l of Part icipation 
Voting 




in Inm ate 
Elections 
V C V C V C 
High 28.6% 29.7% 64.9% 37.8% 41.6% 33.9% 
Medium 53.2% 35. l % 4.1 % 23.4% 27.3% 25.0% 
Low 18.2% 35.1% 31. 1% 37. 7% 31.2% 41.1 % 
"See Appendix I, question s 1-6 for ope rationalization of thj s table 
Lege nd : V = Vienna; C = Cummin s; 's equal 77 and 112 
Runn ing f or 











7 Gresham M . Sykes, The Society of Capti ves, (Prin ce ton , N.J. : Prin ceton Univ e rsity Pr ess , 
1958), pp . 63-83. 
8 For the conventi onal American rates see: Sidn ey Verba and Norman Nie, Participati on in 
A merica, (New York: Harp er and Row, 1972), p . 31. 
9'fhj s process is sometimes called "ge arin g-down ." Beca use pri son life usually beco mes 
extremely routin e and pe tty, and beca use communi cation with oth e r human s is res tricted to a 
small numb er, any eve nt out of th e ordin ary rece ives widespr ead att ention amon g pri soners. For 
a discussion of th e closed natur e of pri sons, see: E rvin g Goffman, "On the Chara cte ristics ofT otal 
In stituti ons: Th e Inm ate World ," in Donald R. Cressey , Th e Prison, (New York: Holt , Rinehart , 
and Win ston, 1961), p . 16. 
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TABLE 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMAL INMATE PARTICIPATION " 
LevPI of 
Infonna l A ctivity 
High 
Moderate ly High 
Medium 
Modera te ly Low 
Low 














"See Append ix 1, ques tions 7- 12 for opera tionalization of tab le 
Ind ependent Variables and Find ings 
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Four se ts of ind epend ent variables are examin ed for the ir re lationship s 
with th e two types of inmat e politi cs. Th ese are: (1) pr e-penal socio-eco nomi c 
characteristics; (2) politi ca l attitud es; (3) pr e-penal politi cal expe riences; and 
(4) penal vari ables . All coefficient s report ed are Kend all Tau B's at .;;; .05 leve l 
of significance. 10 
Th e first se t of pr e-penal sociological variables is divided int o two sub se ts. 
Th e first sub se t cont ain s e lement s th at indi cate ea rly exposure to crimin al 
experiences : size of plac e reared , brok en hom e , and str ee t gang involv e ment . 
Resea rch has sugges ted th at th ese are linked with crimin alit y and influ ence 
amon g pri soners.11 However, thi s resea rch find s th at none is related signifi-
cantl y to pri soner politi cs in e ith e r sampl e of pri sone rs, although th e re is a 
wea k (Ke ndall' s T au B = 0 . 20) inclin ation for me n from large r urb an 
back ground s to be mor e involv ed in th e inform al activiti es of th e minimum 
securit y sampl e. With rega rd to th e di stribution s of thi s sub se t, some 60 and 
54 pe rce nt of th e minimum and maximum sec urit y sampl es respect ive ly 
report th ey are from places ove r 15,000 ; 12 and som e 31 pe rce nt of both group s 
report th at th eir parent s are divorce d or were never marri ed ; simil arily 31 
pe rcent of both group s say th ey were str ee t gang memb e rs before incarce ra-
tion . 
Th e second sociological sub se t cont ains pr e-penal var iables whi ch lite ra-
tur e indi cates could be important tow ard parti cipation : occup ational statu s, 
education , social mobility , race, and age. In ge neral , th e re is a mild inclin ation 
for each vari e ty of inm ate politi cs to increase in both th e minimum and 
maximum securit y sampl es as th ese variabl es increase. 
1°Kendall's Tau Bi s a measu re of association be twee n two ordinal ly measured variab les. For 
details see: Hub ert M. Blalock, Soc ial Statisti cs, ( ew York: McGraw -Hill Book Co. , 1960), pp. 
3 19-25. 
11 Marshall B. Clinard , (Sociology of Del)iant Be hav ior, ew York: Holt, Rinehart , and 
Win ston, Inc. , 1966), pp. 104, 317-18, 225. 
12Onl y size of place may be compared to the public, and Verba and ie report that the fee ling 
of common identit y rather than size is the important variable for the pu blic. See Verba and ie, 
Participati on in A merica , pp . 236-37. 
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TABLE 3 
"On the outsid e, what was the best legal job you had?" 
Joh Minimum Security 
Statu s (Vienna) 
High (e .g., Teacher 0%(0) 
or Lawyer ) 
Medium (e.~., Plumb e r 
or Mechanic ) 
Low (e .g. , Hired 








Looking at this second subset of sociological variables in more detail, Table 
3 illustrates that the pre-penal occupational status of the prisoners is the usual 
preponderence of lower SES found in state prisons. 13 Regarding relation-
ships , the prisoners in both groups are mildly inclined to increase their 
participation in both types of prisoner politics significantly (,s;;; .05) as their 
pre-penal job status increases (Formal: Vienna campaign 0.25, office 0.27; 
Cummins: office 0.20. Informal: Vienna 0.29; Cummins 0.24). 14 
Looking at education , both sets of prisoners grouped in the junior and 
senior high school categories (about 75 percent). The maximum security 
(Cummins ) men show no relationships, while the minimum group does 
slightly increase its involvement in prisoner politics with higher education 
(Formal: interest 0. 16, campaign 0.12, office 0.22; Informal: 0.20). Thus, 
while various studies have shown an increase in the public 's conventional 
political participation accompanying increases in job status and education, this 
is the consistent pattern only for the minimum security sample , the maximum 
group has this pattern for job status and inmate politics but not for education 
and inmate politics. 
Pre-penal social mobility was measured by comparing the best legal job of 
the prisoner with that of his father; so little existed no relationships could be 
ascertained. 15 
Black Americans comprise about 11 percent of the population, yet state 
prisons routinely contain 30 to 60 percent black men. 16 This disproportionate 
black share of the penal population was expected to be important because 
prisons are thought to reflect various societal conditions, including racial 
13Richard Korn and Lloyd McCorkle , Criminology and Penology , (New York: Holt , 
Rinehart , and Winston , 1959), p. 319. 
14 Enclosed in parentheses are the statistically significant (,s;;.05) Kendall Tau B correlation 
coefficients specifying the relationships just discussed. Intrepreting this for the reader: The 
Vienna sample displays a statistically significant coefficient of0 .25 between pre-penal job status 
and inmate campaign activities and one of0.27 between inmate office activities and pre-penal job 
status , while among the Cummins respondents a significant coefficient of 0.20 exists between 
pre-penal job status and inmate office activities . And the Vienna group 's informal participation 
increased as pre-penal job status increased to the extent of a 0.29 Tau B coe ficient, with tbe 
Cummins men increasing at a 0.24 coefficient . 
15This lack of social mobility is of note to social theorists who link crime to lack of legitimate 
opportunities for low classes to achieve material and status rewards . See: Marshall Clinard, 
Sociology of Deviant Behavior , pp. 317-18. 
16Korn and McCorkle, Criminology and Penology, p. 319. 
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tensions .17 The minimum security institution (Vienna) normally contained 40 
percent black, while its sample has 38; these percentages for the maximum 
security sample are 48 and 31 respectively. 
TABLE 4 
AVERAGES • OF I MATE PARTICIPATION-BY RACE AND SECURITY 
Fonnal Inmat e 
Participation 
Running for or 
Minimum Security 
Black Whit e 
Maximum Security 
Black Whit e 
Holding an Inmate 1.66 1.66 1.65 l.82 
Office (29)< ( 4 7) (34) (76) 
Campaign Activities 2.50 2.26 2.40 2.03 
in Inmate Elections (29) (47) (34) (76) 
Voting in 3.93 3.61 3.63 2.86 
Inmat e Elections (29) (42) (34) (76) 
Inter est in 2.48 2.34 2.38 2.18 
Inmate Elections (29) (47) (34) (76) 
Informal Inmat e 3.06b 2.82 2.81 3.28 
Participation (29) (47) (34) (76) 
"The scale ranged from 5 to 1 for each of the formal activiti es (i.e. , High = 5, Medium = 3, Low = l 
corresponding to the rows in Tabl e 1). 
~he scale is also 5 to 1 for informal activities . 
"The numbers in parentheses are the number of respondents in that cell. 
In each sample black prisoners participate slightly more in formal inmate 
politics, except holding inmate office among the maximum security group. 
The results for informal activities are mixed: blacks higher among the 
minimum security men but lower within the maximum set. However, in all 
instances these differences are small and none is statistically significant. 
Compared to the American public, the inmates in general seem to exhibit the 
hierarchical pattern reported for the general public. 18 At the same time, black 
prisoners with their slightly higher formal activity rate, appear to differ from 
the reports of black conventional political participation in the general pub-
lic.19 
The ages of the men surveyed averaged 26 and 29 for the minimum and 
maximum samples respectively . As expected, 20 our samples display a mild 
tendency for both types of inmate politics to increase as their ages increase 
(Forma l: Vienna voting 0.20 , office 0.20 ; Cummins voting 0.17, office 0.19; 
Informal: Vienna 0.27 ; Cummins 0.32). These relationships are similar to 
those reported for the American public concerning age and political participa-
17Autobiography of Malcolm X , (New York: Grove Press , Inc. , 1966); Georg e Jackson , 
Soledad Broth er, ( ew York: Bantam Books, 1970); Etheridge Kn;ght , Black Voices From Prison , 
( ew York: Pathfinder Press. 1970). 
18 Milbrath , Political Participation , p . 18. Only interest in inmate elections did not scale 
hierarcrucally . 
19 Matthews and Prothro have reported that in the Deep South blacks participated less in 
"visible" actions , e.g . , campaigns , but more in "invisible " actions , e .g., discussing politics among 
themselves. See their Negroes and the ew Southern Politics , pp. 44-45. And Verba and Nie have 
written that blacks were under represented in contactinp; public officials either for personal or 
communal concerns , and in being inactive ; but that blacks were over represented in being 
inactives , voting only , and in partisan camprugns . See their Partici.pation in Am erica, p. 152. 
2
°Clarenc e Schrag , "Leadership Among Prison Inmates ," Am erican Sociological Review, 
Vol. XIX (Feb ., 1954), p. 34. 
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tion , 21 and support s the noti on that inm ate participation increase with ex-
perience as it app arentl y does in the genera l publi c. 22 
TABLE 5 
.. When you were on the stree ts, abo ut how often did you d iscuss political th ings?" 
Mi nimum Security Maximum Secu rity 
(Vienn a) (N =77) (C ummin s) (N =112) 
A Great Deal 10.4%(8) 7.1%(8) 
Oft n 14.3%(11) 5.4%(6) 
Occasionally 4 .1 %(37) 50. 9%(57) 
Almost ever 27.3%(21) 36.6%(41) 
.. When you were e ligible to vote on the outside, how olien did you vote in various local, state, and 
national e lections?" 
)ways 21.l %(12) 16.5%(17) 
sually 17.5%(10) 7.8%(8) 
Occasionally 17.5%(10) 20.4%(21) 
eve r 43.9%(25) 55.3%(57) 
"On the out side, did you every go to a political rally or mee ting of any kind?" 
Often 11.7%(9) 9. %(11) 
Occasionally 24. 7%( 19) 24. l %(27) 
On ce or Twice 29.9%(23) 20.5%(23) 
eve r 33.8%(26) 45.5%(51) 
"On the out side , did you eve r hold an e lective office of any kind ?" 
Yes 22. 7%(17) 
o 77.3%(5 ) 
20. %(22) 
79.2%(83) 
Turning our attention now toward the second se t of inm ate' s pre-penal 
conv entional political experiences, four activiti e are observ d : discussion of 
politic s, votin g, att endan ce at rallies, and e lective offices h Id. Th e di stribu -
tion s in Tabl 5 mee t expectation s in being lower than that of the public 's in 
discus sion of politi cs and votin g. How eve r, the pri sone r's att ndance at rallies 
and the holdin g of e lec tive office are higher. 23 Regardin g relation ship s, gen-
erally ·there is som mild to mod erate carryov er of pr e-penal political experi-
ences into formal inmat e politic s, but only incon sistentl y into informal pri s-
one r activiti es. Mor e specifically, as the leve l of pr e-penal politi cal di scussion s 
increases both types of inmat e politic s tend to significantl y incr eas in each 
sampl e (Formal: Vienna int r st 0.26, votin g 0.26 ; Cummin s inte res t 0.23, 
voting 0.23, campaign 0.28 , office 0.11. Inform al: Vienn a 0.14 ; Cummin s 
0.21 ). With respec t to pr e-penal voting , ther is a mod erat e tend ency for 
formal inmat e activiti es to incr eas in both sampl es with higher pr e-penal 
voting levels, but no re lation ships regardin g informal (Formal: Vienn a voting 
0.25, office 0 .25; Cummins int erest 0.23 , votin g 0.16, campaign 0.17 , office 
0.17). Formal inmate activiti es in both groups incr eases mod erat e ly as pre-
21 Milbr ath , Politi cal Participati o11, p . 134. 
22Verba and ie, Parti cipati on in America , p. 14 . 
23The 31 perce nt of the publi c report ed as expressing a politi cal opinion see ms hig_her than 
the inmates, thou gh a different qu estion was used , see : John Robin son, Je rrold Rusk, and Kendr a 
Head , Measures of Political A ttitud es, (Ann Arbor , Mich.: Institut e for Social Resea rch, July, 
1969), pp . 591, 602. Th e one-third of pri soners who say they usually or always voted is b low the 
publi c, see: / bid ., p . 591. While att endance at rallies was low, it was higher than that report ed for 
the publi c, see: / bid ., p. 604. o doubt , the pri soner·s elective office figure was inflated by them 
countin g any office . 
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penal attend ance at rallies incr eases , but thi s patt ern is found only amon g the 
maximum men for informal action s (Form al: Vienna int erest 0.17, votin g 0.20; 
Cummin s interest 0.28, votin g 0.23, camp aign 0.17, office 0. 13. Inform al: 
Cummin s 0.17). No relation ship exists betwee n pr e-penal electiv e offices held 
and inmate politi cs. 24 
The third set of variabl es are politi cal attitud es . Beca use much of the 
rhetori c of rece nt pri son upri sings has overton es of politic al alienation, two 
attitudinal aspects are examin ed : (1) Th e fee ling of tru st , confid ence , or 
affec tion th at inmat es dir ec t toward th e "nation " (diffu se support ) . 2 5 
Rese archers have found thi s to be one dim ension of politi cal alienation . 26 (2) 
The extent to which pri soners fee l they can influ ence their politi cal environ-
ment . Thi s is observed by inquirin g into the ir feeling of politi cal futilit y. Table 
6 displa ys that th e maximum security group ha s a significantl y higher fee ling of 
confid ence in th e national governm ent than the minimum set. How eve r, both 
inmate group s are lower th an the 90 percent of th e publi c who agree d or 
agree d stron gly with a similar statement 27 (combinin g the Stron gly Agree and 
Agree percentages for th e first qu estion in Table 6: minimum security percent 
45; maximum securit y perce nt 69). With respec t to relation ship s, only the 
maximum security men mildl y incr ease some formal activiti es as th etr diffuse 
support incr eases (int eres t 0.24, votin g 0.20, campai gn 0.29). 
TABLE 6 
"I usually have connd ence that the gove rnm e nt will do what is right. ··• 
Minimu m Security Maximum Security 
(Vienna) (Cummin s) 
Strongly Agree 7.8%(6) 13.4%(15) 
Agree 37. 7%(29) 55.4%162) 
Disagree 45.5%(35) 27. 7% 31) 
Strongly Di sagree 9.1 %(7) 3. 1 % 4) 
"E ven if I could vote , it's no use wo rrying m y head about publi c affairs on the ou tside, I couldn 't 
do anythin g about th em anyway."b 
Str ongly Agree 5.2 %(4) 8.0%(9) 
Agree 22. l %(11) 24. l %(21) 
Disagree 48. l %(31) 49. 1 %(55) 
Stron gly Di sagree 24. 7%(19) 18.8%(21) 
"Measure of diffuse supp ort 
bM eas ure of politi cal futilit y 
Th e prison ers displa y high e r political futility than the 20 percent of the 
public who agreed or agree d stron gly with a similar statement 28 (combinin g 
24Thi s last statement is rende red less re liable by th e small 's (Vienna 17; Cummin s 22) 
resu ltin g from 20 pe rce nt of eac h sampl e having reported holdin g any elec tive office before 
incarce ration, e .g. , school and organization offices. 
25David Easton , A Systems A nalysis of Political Life, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. , 
1965), p. 273. 
26John Jackson III , "Th e Political Behavior and Socio-Eco nomic Background s of Black 
Stud ent s: Th e Antece dent s of Protest" , Mid west Journal of Political Science, Vol. XV , ( ov., 
1971), pp . 661-686. 
27The qu es t. ion used with th e publi c was: "I usually have confidence that the gove rnm ent will 
do what is right ." Robin son, Rusk, and Head , Measures of Political At titu des, p . 177. 
28The item used with the publi c was: "It' s no use worry ing my head about public affair s, l 
can't do an ythin g about th em anyway." Robin son, Rusk, and H ead , Measures of Political 
Attitu des , p. 178. 
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the Strongl y Agree and Agree per ent age for th seco nd question in Table 6 
yie lds : minimum 27 percent ; maximum 32). Ob s rving the re lation ship s, eac h 
sample has a mild but con istent tend ency to decrease both forms of in mat 
politics as the ir rat of politic al futilit increases (Form al: Vi nna int er st 
- 0.21 , voting - 0.26, campaign - 0.11; Cummins inter es t - 0.36, voting 
- 0.31, campaign - 0.28 , office - 0.16. Informal : Vienna - 0.23 ; Cummins 
- 0.15). This pattern is similar to that of th public . 29 
Th e final se t of variables are penal in natur e and are divid ed into thr ee 
subsets. Th e first subset consists of criminality in the prison ers' family , reform 
school experience, and age at first arr st. Th ese were expect ed to b indica-
tions of skills and/or alues that would promote int rp rsonal influenc among 
prisoners ; the y did not. o re lationship was found . Th e di stribution s ar 
pr ese nted in the footnot e below. 30 
The se ond subset of pen al variables is concerned with criminal attitud s 
and m ntal states: adh rence to criminal values, aggressiveness, and penal 
rule violation inclin ation. The first part of Tabl e 7 displays the low adherence 
to criminal values in both samples. Each sample has mod erate trend s toward 
decreasing participation in each form of inmat politics a adh r nee to 
criminal values incr ea es31 (Formal : Vienna interest - 0.14, voting - 0.22 ; 
ummin interest - 0.22, voting - 0.20, campaign - 0.33 , office - 0.14. In -
formal : Vi nna - 0.23; Cummins - 0.24). 
Th e samples also illustrat e a low aggressiveness (second part of Table 7). 
More aggressive inmates have a mildly higher informal involvem ent (Vienna 
0.14; Cummins 0.19) but no relation ships with formal prisoner politic s. 32 
29 Verba and i , Participati on i,1 America, p. . 
3
°Cri minality in the family was asce rtain ed by asking,· · How many close relatives do you have 
who have done tim e?" Ove r one-half of the Vienna men and 3 perce nt of t he Cummins group said 
that th ey had at leas t on such re lative. ome 23 and 38 percen t of the ienna and Cummins men 
respectively repo rt havin g been in a reform school. About two-third s say th ey were arres ted for 
th e first tim e by age 18, anoth e r 16 and 17 pe rce nt of Vienna and Cummins men respectively 
repo rt th eir first arrest was between the ag, s of 19 and 21. 
31 Literature would have sugges ted otherwise. ee: Donald Garrity , "the Pri son as a Re-
habiJ;tation Agency ," in Donald Cressey , ed ., The Priso n, p. 359. 
32 Clemmer stron gly impli ed that inmate lead rs were aggressive, thou gh he did not use the 
te rm , Donald Clemmer , The Prison Community , ( ew York: Holt , Rinehart , and Win ston , Inc., 
1968), Ch . VI; Syke desc rib d his ··rea l man " role- typ e as dominant and sugges ted he was 
aggressive thou gh not in an unthinkin g mann er, Gresham ykes, The Society of Captives, 
(Prince ton , J·: Prin ce ton University Press, 1958), pp . 101-102; McCleery has sugges ted that 
since indepen ence is a crucial value among pri sone rs, in0u ential inm ates are at leas t aggress ive 
enough to avoid being aggressed against , Richard McCleery, "The Governmental Process and 
Informal Social Control" , in Donald R. Cressey , ed ., The Prison, p. 166; ch rag reported a stron g 
tendency for influential inmates to be aggress ive, larence chrag , '"Leaders hip Among Pri son 
Inmat es," p. 40. 
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TABLE 7 
''People who work for a living are fools," and " Because of the way a man is treated in prison , he 
should take the first chance he has to get even with society." • 
Minimum Security Maximum Security 
(Vienna ) (Cummins ) 
Strongly Agree 1.3%(1) 6.3 %(7) 
Agree 6.5%(5} 5.4 %(6) 
Disagree 29. 9%(23) 33. 9%(38) 
Strongly Disagree 62.4 %(48) 54. l %(61) 
"Jfl want somet hin g, I don't let anythin g stand in my way as long as I know I can get by with it . " b 
Always True 0% 7.1 %(8) 
Usually True 11. 7%(9) 8. 9%(10) 
Sometimes True 41.6 %(32) 42.0 %(47) 
ever True 46.8%(36) 42.0 %(47) 
" I get more tickets (write-ups ) than most guys here do ."c 
Strongly Agree 1.3%(1) 1.8%(2) 
Agree 0% ll.8 %(13l 
Disagre e 39.5 %(30) 62. 7%(69 
Strongly Disagree 59.2%(45) 23.6 %(26) 
"The responses to these two questions were comb ined to measure adhere nce to crimina l values. 
"Measure of aggressiveness. 
' Measure of penal rule violation rate . 
The maximum security men are significantl y mor e inclin ed to break penal 
rul es (last part of Table 7). How ever , with respect to relationships, the 
maximum men only slightl y increase one formal inmat e activity (office 0.13) as 
the ir violations incr ease. And, while the minimum men show no effec t on 
formal activiti es they dec rease their inform al involvement a littl e with higher 
violations ( -). 
Th e final sub set of penal variables are: length of sent ence, time serve d, and 
recidivi sm. In genera l, th e formal inmate activities incr ease only among the 
minimum men with incr eases in thi s subset, wh ereas informal involvem ent 
incr eases in both sample s as thi s subset incr eases. Specifically , as the length of 
sentence incr eases the minimum men incr ease their formal and informal 
rates, while th e maximum group does so only informally (Formal: Vienna 
int eres t 0.23 , voting 0.21 , campaign 0.16, office 0.27. Informal : Vienna 0.25; 
Cummins 0.21). Tim e se rved in pri son has a small increase in both samples for 
each form of inmate politics (Formal : Vienna int eres t 0.24, voting 0.27 , 
campai gn 0.24, office 0.24 ; Cummins office 0.20. Informal : Vienna 0.25; 
Cummins 0.24). Fin ally, rec idivism shows only one relation ship with formal 
inmate politic s (Vienna voting 0.19 ) and informal actions incr ease only among 
maximum men (0.20). Th e distribution s are in the footnote below. 33 
Summary and Conclusions 
This resea rch has conceptualized political participation among prison e rs in 
two ways: First , in te rms of th eir involv ement in activities concerned with 
elec tion among prison ers to inmat e offices; seco nd , in terms of an informal 
inmat e "pecking order", ascertained by whose advice is sought among prison-
33 Length of sente nces varied , but 30 and 37 percent of the Vienna and Cumm ins sa~p les are 
over 10 years. Also, time served v>tried bu t was conce nt rated in the 2-to-10 range . Rec1d1v1sm was 
41 and 70 percent respectively for Vienna and Cummi ns. 
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ers. These formal and informal inmate political activities are similarly pat-
terned in both maximum and minimum penal security samples of volun-
teers , 34 and the prisoners ' participation rates in formal inmate politics are 
higher than the general public 's participation in conventional politics. To the 
extent that they are comparable, selected variables associated with the gen-
eral public's participation in conventional politics tend also to be mildly 
related to prisoner politics in the same direction as the public 's especially in 
the minimum security sample. Finally , formal and informal inmate influen-
tials tend to have similar characteristics except that informal leaders are 
somewhat more aggressive and incljned to adhere to criminal values. 
Inmate influentials , like leaders in general, reflect a given group's domi-
nate values and are able to articulate its demands with some success. 35 The 
prisoners in our samples illustrate the emergence of men influential in formal 
inmate politics who are not oriented toward criminal values , are not more 
aggressive, and are not prison rule violators. This is indicative of the penal 
institutions ' reflection of the society in general , with its greater sophistication 
and societal/prison communications. However, informal influentials continue 
to be characterized by more aggressiveness and adherence to criminal values , 
with those in the maximum security sample also inclined to be penal institu-
tion rule violators (though the minimum security informal influentials are 
lower rule violators ). Formal and informal influentials differ on these charac-
teristics because the men represent different "constituencies" , i.e . , formal 
leaders must be capable of articulating prisoners ' dominant values and aims to 
penal authorities, thus they represent the more general prisoner population ; 
whereas, since informal leaders do not have to deal with those outside the 
society of prisoners, they may be men of prominence in a specific clique of four 
or five like-minded prisoners but where the cliques may differ from one 
another in values and aims (cliques usually center around similarities in age , 
backgrounds, common criminal experiences , etc. ). 
Having an early exposure to criminal elements does not provide an advan-
tage in acquiring information and skills of influence among prisoners. Various 
indications of such experiences - size of place born and raised, broken home 
experiences, membership and/or position in a pre-penal street gang, criminal-
ity in the family, reform school background , and age at first arrest- are of no 
importance in inmate politics. It is experience in prison that provides the 
opportunity to acquire the knowledge , values and skills necessary for influ-
ence among prisoners : In both samples there is a tendency for men older than 
the institution's average (but not old), those with longer sentences , greater 
time served, and recidivists to be more active in both types of inmate politics 
(except for recidivism and informal involvement among the minimum security 
respondents ). 
34 The volunteers included those elected to inmate office in both samples. 
35 A discussion of leadership theory is contained in : Ralph M. Stogdill , Handbook of Lead er-
ship : A Surv ey of Leader ship, (New York: The Free Press , 1974), ch. l. 
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Do politi cally alienat ed , fatalistic men have a di sproportion ate influence 
among pri sone rs as some rece nt riot s have sugges ted?36 Since our samples are 
not of rioters , thi s question cannot be dir ec tly answered. How eve r, in the 
samples prisoners are mor e politicall y alienated than the general public , but 
politically alienated inmate s are not more influential in inmate politics. 
Moreover , those inmates more fatalistic concerning their influenc e over 
public affairs are less active in pri soner politic s. 
Black men particip ate somewhat mor e in each sample for both types of 
inmate politics . How eve r, in light of the att ention that race has rece ntly 
received, one would have expec ted a stron ge r relation ship. Th e author 
sugges ts the reason race is not so import ant is beca use black men do not 
comprise a majority of eith er penal population surveyed. Th e data he rein do 
not allow dir ec t analysis of the impact of percentage black (since there are only 
two samples). How ever, indir ect evidence from other sources is supportive: 
In penal institution al arrangements ranging from the Pontia c, Illinoi s in stitu-
tion for young offenders to the California maximum security prison at San 
Qu entin , race appears vital when black pri soners compris e greater than half of 
these population s. At Pontia c you ng black stree t gang members are report ed 
by former residents 37 as overwhelmingly dominant , while at San Qu entin the 
former warden claims that racial-based gangs (Aryan Broth erhood , Black 
Guerrilla Army, Nuestra Famil y, Mexican Mafia) are promin ent and make 
control difficult with violence inevitabl e. 38 
Involv ement in "lower" leve ls of pre-penal conventional political activities 
(i.e ., politival discussions and voting) is an asset with re spect to formal inmat e 
politic s, (thou gh not for informal ); howeve r, having engaged in "higher" leve ls 
of pr e-penal activities (i.e., campaign and office) is not. This seems to be the 
case beca use men who have been highly involved in conventional pr e-penal 
politic s are mor e inclin ed to identify with th e establish ed order outside the 
prison (or are identified with it by the other prisoners ), and are not trust ed 
and/or are not int eres ted in inm ate affairs. 
Thu s, pri sone r political activities are conducted in a patt ern similar to the 
convention al political activities of the genera l public , although at somew hat 
higher rates ; and , whil e selected variables that are associated with the public 's 
conventional political participation are mildly inclined to show similar rela-
tion ship s in prison er politic s, societal and historical conditions are also re-
flec ted in prisoner politics , as are the probl ems inh erent in incarc era tion. 
APPENDIX I 
Thi s app endi x is organized for the reader's convenience in int erpr eting 
Tables 1 and 2. Qu estion s 1-6 are the indic ators of formal inmate political 
36 New York Times Ind ex, 1971, pp. 1385-89. 
37This information came from interviews with former residents at the Pontiac instituti on who 
were in the Work Release Ce nter in Carbonda le, Jllinois. 
38
"Ex-warden Sees Violence as Unmanageab le in Future ", A,·kansas Gazette, July 6, 1974, 
p. 6A. 
78 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
participation . The designations of HIGH , MEDIUM, and LOW above the 
alternative answers correspond to those rows in Table 1. The numbers in 
parenthesis beside these designations are the values assigned to them. Ques -
tions 7-12 are averaged to measure informal inmate involvement. The desig-
nations of HIGH to LOW above the alternatives , and the values assigned to 
them (in parenthesis ), correspond to the rows in Table 2. 
1. How interested would you say you are in things like the Resident's (or 
Inmate 's) Council? 
(5) HIGH (3) MEDIUM (1) LOW 
I OTTEN THINK AND O CE IN AWHILE I I ALMOST NEVER 
TALK ABOUT SUCH 
THINGS 
THINK AND TALK 
ABOUT SUCH THINGS 
THINK OR TALK 
ABOUT SUCH THI GS 
2. As you know , some penal institutions allow inmates to elect other 
inmates to offices such as an Inmat e Council. When you have had the chance 
to vote in such inmate elections , how often have you voted? 
(5) HIGH (3) MEDIUM (1) LOW 
EVERY OR ALMOST ONCE I A- ALMOST EVER 
EVERY TIME WHILE OR EVER 
(Questions 3 and 4 averaged to obtain inmate campaign activities .) 
3. I try to get guys organized to help elect the right man to the Resident's 
(or Inmate 's) Council? 
(5) HIGH 
THIS IS DEFINITELY 







4. I try to talk other men into voting for the right man for Resident's (or 
Inmate 's) Council. 
(alternatives same as question 3) 
(Questions 5 and 6 averaged for inmate office activities .) 
5. I have been a candidate for an elective inmate (or resident ) office such as 
the Resident Council. 
(5) HIGH 
YES, I HAVE SEVERAL 
TIMES 
(3) MEDIUM 
YES, I HAVE A 
COUPLE OF TIMES 
(1) LOW 
NO , I NEVER HAVE 
6. Have you ever held (or now hold ) any office or position where you were 
elected by other inmates (or residents )? 
(alternatives same as question 5) 
(Questions 7 - 12 averaged to obtain informal involvement. ) 
7. Compared to other residents (inmates ) here , about how much do other 
men take your advice about how to settle an argument or a fight among 
residents (inmates )? 
(5) HIGH (4) MOD . HIGH 
A LOT MORE A LITTLE 
THAN THEY MORE THA 





(2) MOD . LOW (1) LOW 
A LITTLE A LOT LESS 
LESS THA THAN THEY 
THEY DO DO FROM 
MOST ME FROM MOST FROM MOST FROM MOST MOST MEN 
MEN MEN MEN 
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8. Compared to other residents (inmates ) here, about how often do men 
try to find out from you what's going to happen around here? (alternatives 
same as question 7) 
9. Compared with other residents (inmates ) here , about how much do 
other men ask you.r advic e about ways to get "good time?" (alternatives same 
as question 7) 
10. Compared to other residents (inmates ) here , about how often do other 
men ask your advice about what the good jobs are here ? (alternativ es same as 
question 7) 
11. Compared to other residents (inmates ) here , about how much do 
other men listen to what you think should be done about some guy who is 
doing something that messes things up for other residents? (alternatives same 
as question 7) 
12. Compared to other residents (inmates ) here , about how often do men 
ask your advice about how to get housing unit transfers ? (alternatives same as 
question 7) 
